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1 Introduction
What determines student achievement? The usual approach is to think of achievement as the
output of an educational production function. Inputs into this educational production function
include teacher quality, class size, resources, peer eects (possibly positive spillover eects and
negative disruption eects), as well as past achievement since achievement builds on the past
knowledge.
In this paper, we focus on the eects of class size on achievement. This area has been widely
studied in both labor economics and education. Somewhat surprisingly, the estimates are relatively
mixed. A recent paper, Leuven et al. (2008) summarize the state of the debate as follows:
One of the still unresolved issues in education research concerns the eects of class size
on students' achievement. It is by now well-understood that endogeneity problems may
severely bias naive OLS estimates of the class size eect, and that exogenous sources
of variation in class size are key for a credible identication of the class size eect.
Various recent studies acknowledge this and apply convincing identication methods.
This has, however, not led to a denite conclusion about the magnitude or even the
sign of the class size eect.
While performance has been related to class size, there has been little attempt to allow for
nonmonotonicities.1 For example, it could be that larger class size rst raises (as students learn
from each other as well as the teacher) and then lowers achievement (when congestion eects take
over). In this paper, we explicitly allow for such possibilities. We argue that not allowing for
nonmonotonicities could be why the literature has found mixed results.
We use high quality administrative data on Greece to rst show nonparametrically that there
does indeed seem to be such a hump shape in the data. Following this, we estimate a parametric
relationship between class size and achievement while carefully dealing with issues of endogeneity
of class size. We show that class size does matter and that the linear specication form used in
past work may be why past results were mixed. After all, if we t a linear regression when the true
relationship is quadratic, we could get a positive, negative or zero slope depending on the precise
shape of the underlying true quadratic relationship. Our estimates suggest that the shape of this
relationship is relatively at in the relevant region, namely the region close to the chosen class
size. As a result, a marginal reduction in class size can have a small positive eect on achievement.
Moreover, as the chosen class size, in the presence of adjustment costs, will exceed the class size
at which achievement is maximized, a large reduction in class size could easily move achievement
1Most work assumes a linear form.
1
to the other side of the hump and have little or no eect on achievement. For these reasons, the
eect of increases versus decreases in class size can be very asymmetric. All of this is consistent
with what the literature has found: namely that decreasing class size is a costly way of raising
achievement.
We further explore the data to look for evidence of quantile eects. We nd that the hump
shape is present across all quantiles, i.e., for students of all abilities. The hump shape is however
more pronounced for worse students.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we put our work in perspective relative to the
literature. In Section 3, we describe where the data came from, present some summary statistics
and descriptive regressions. In Section 4, we present the rst nonparametric evidence of a hump
shaped relationship in class size and achievement. In Section 5, we take a parametric approach
and use the Hoxby instrument, see Hoxby (2000), to control for endogeneity. In Section 6, we
present our quantile IV results.
With the estimates of the eects of class size on achievement in hand, we are in a position to
understand how class size is chosen. If the government cares about achievement, and faces costs
of adding classes, its behavior in terms of the number of classes it chooses as enrollment uctuates
helps us estimate the costs involved. We use our reduced form estimates in a dynamic structural
model of class size to estimate hiring/ring and marginal cost of adding a class. Our estimates
here are in line with actual teacher salaries. Finally, in Greece, as in much of the rest of the world,
teachers unions are a powerful force to be reckoned with. Their power is expressed not only in
terms of wages set but in terms of the ability to re teachers at will. We use the model to ask
whether inexibility in terms of unions creating high ring (and even maybe hiring) costs might
be driving class size choices by government and the impact of this on student achievement if any.
We nd that unions, even if they raise costs and class size, have a small eect on achievement.
Finally, we look at the costs versus benets of class size requirements. Section 7 concludes.
2 Relation to the Literature
Given the increasing importance of skills in the labor force in the age of robotics and articial
intelligence, there is intense interest in what drives educational attainment. A small part of this
debate has focused on the role of class size on achievement. An excellent, though slightly dated
survey can be found in Hanushek (2003) and Rivkin et al. (2005).
The main problem is that class size itself is a choice, i.e., it is highly endogenous. Teach-
ers and headmasters are better informed about students than the econometricians. Based on
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students' characteristics that the econometricians do not observe, headmasters tend to allocate
better students to larger classes, thus generating a positive correlation between class size and stu-
dent performance. As a result, OLS estimates of the coecients on class size cannot be interpreted
causally. This is not a problem specic to class size, but is more general. For example, estimat-
ing eects of other school inputs on pupil outcomes is also complicated by potential endogeneity
issues.2 The usual way to deal with this problem is to have a good instrument or an experiment
and this is essentially the route the literature has taken as described below.
The best known experiment is the Tennessee STAR experiment. Students were randomly
assigned to dierent sized classes. This should make it straightforward to estimate at least the
policy eect of class size. However, there remain concerns about whether teacher quality changed,
and the attrition and entry of students throughout the experiment (which could also have been
endogenous) could confound the results (Hoxby, 2000; Hanushek, 1999). Krueger (1999) and
Krueger and Whitmore (2001) nd that smaller class sizes in kindergarten and rst grade seemed
to have a signicant and lasting positive eect on academic achievement.
More recently, Jepsen and Rivkin (2009) study California's class size reduction program for
grades K-3. This reduced class size on average from 30 to 20 at a cost of roughly a billion dollars.
They nd this policy raised math and reading achievement by roughly .10 and .06 standard
deviations of the average test scores respectively, holding other factors constant. This is about
the same eect as that of having a teacher with two more years of experience. Assuming teachers'
salaries rise at less than 15% per year of experience, class size reductions would seem the more
expensive option.3 Chetty et al. (2014) shows that teacher quality measured as value added has a
huge eect on outcomes. Using U.S. data on over a million primary school children, he shows that
replacing a teacher in the lowest 5% of value added with the average teacher would have signicant
positive eects on outcomes like college attendance and teenage pregnancy and increase the lifetime
earnings of the students in a classroom by $250,000.
In contrast to much of the work using eld experiments above, an elegant and often used
quasi experimental approach is based on class size limits which turn out to be relatively common.
Angrist and Lavy (1999) noticed that in Israeli public schools, by law, there could be no more
than 40 students in a class. Thus, if a cohort grew beyond 40, there would be an exogenous fall
in class size from 40 to 21, while if the cohort grew over 80, there would be an exogenous fall in
class size from 40 to 27, and so on. They show that without correcting for endogeneity, class size
2School inputs are chosen by parents, school administrators, teachers, and politicians at both local and national
levels. For instance, parents locating close to resource abundant schools may have chosen to locate there because
they care a lot about their children's education and so also invest more time in their children's education (creating
a upward bias).
3It is also worth noting that the increase in demand for teachers resulted in a fall in their quality.
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seems to be positively associated with achievement, but when endogeneity is controlled for the
sign is reversed. This makes economic sense as when students are good, larger class sizes can be
tolerated which will bias OLS estimates upwards. Their estimates are for grades 3, 4 and 5. The
coecient on class size is not signicant for grade 3, but is signicantly negative for grades 4 and
5. In general, estimates suggest that class size is a costly way of improving achievement.
Other papers which exploit maximum class-size rules include Bonesrønning (2003) for Norway,
Urquiola (2006), Browning and Heinesen (2007) and Bingley et al. (2007) for Denmark. Browning
and Heinesen (2007) focus not only on class size but also on teacher hours per student. The class
size is limited to 28 students in Denmark. However, Bingley et al. (2007) nd that the target class
size in the data seems to be closer to 24 suggesting that the limit is not binding and the quasi
experimental approach is invalid.
The other approach to correct for endogeneity of class size is related to the work of Hoxby
(2000). In the absence of binding class size limits, one might think of using variations in overall
enrollment as exogenous shocks. Hoxby goes a step further: she ts a quartic to the enrollment
data and uses deviations from the quartic as the exogenous variation. In this way, she controls for
trends in enrollment.
Gary-Bobo and Mahjoub (2013) use data on French junior high schools and Urquiola (2006)
use Bolivian data and follow Hoxby's approach. Though the estimated causal eects of larger class
size tend to be negative, they remain small. In the context of the literature, our approach follows
Hoxby (2000). In our work, as there is no explicit class size cap, we cannot use the Angrist and
Lavy approach. As a result, we use Hoxby's instrument.
Levin (2001) and Dobbelsteen et al. (2002) use a third source of quasi experimental variation.
They use PRIMA data. This longitudinal survey of Dutch students in grades 2,4, 6 and 8 in
1994-5 is rich in information including IQ as well as a new instrument for class size. Dutch rules
link the number of teachers that can be hired to enrollment and this provides quasi exogenous
variation in the number of classrooms. Levin explores peer and quantile eects. Dobbelsteen et
al. (2002) also nd strong peer eects on student achievement. Controlling for peer eects, they
nd class size eect to either be insignicant or signicantly negative.
Even with a good experiment, the literature has made a clear distinction between interpreting
the coecients as structural parameters (i.e., the causal eect of class size) and policy estimates
(i.e., the expected eect of an exogenous policy on class size). For example, suppose we changed
class size experimentally (so that one group of students was in large classes and another was in
small classes) and parental behavior responded to these changes, the estimated eects would be
compound eects including the pure eect of changing class size and the induced one on parental
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behavior. Todd and Wolpin (2003) in particular emphasize that estimates of the class-size eect
even using experimental data should be interpreted as policy eects. In contrast, estimates aimed
at identifying structural parameters of the education production function could be interpreted
as the pure eect of class size, if other channels, like parental inputs in the example above, are
accounted for.
It is worth noting that we could nd only two papers that allowed for nonmonotonic eects.
Borland et al. (2005) uses data from the Kentucky Department of Education for the third grade
in 1989-90. They specify a four-equation simultaneous equation system. Class size, achievement,
market competition and teacher salary are the endogenous variables and achievement is allowed to
be a quadratic function of class size. They argue that class size and GPA could be nonmonotonic.
Why? Students learn from peers like themselves and the larger the class, the more likely it is that
they have peers like themselves and GPA rises with class size. On the other hand, there is crowding
and ultimately these congestion forces dominate so that GPA rst rises with class size and then
falls which is what they nd. There are a number of issues with the paper. First, the economic
model behind their simultaneous equation system and the exclusion restrictions used is far from
clear. Second, their estimates are dicult to reconcile with their data patterns. Their estimates
suggest a peak of achievement around class size 26. If class size was being chosen to maximize
achievement subject to costs, the optimal class size must be to the right of the peak of achievement.
The optimal class size cannot be below 26 as raising class size would raise achievement and reduce
costs. However, 99% of data has class size below 26 which is hard to explain in terms of economics.
The paper also only presents the achievement equation and even for this equation, presents only
a subset of the estimated coecients.
Bandiera et al. (2010) use rich data on student performance in undergraduate classes in the
UK. They allow for both nonmonotonicities and quantile eects. However, they assume that
assignment of students to classes is random as they have no instrument. Their data has student
performance over time as well as teacher assignment so that they can incorporate both teacher
and student xed eects. Though they allow for nonmonotonic eects, they nd class size always
reduces performance, though the eect is not linear. Moreover, they nd that class size seems to
aect better students more.
We argue that class size eects seem to be nonmonotonic, with class size initially increasing
and then reducing achievement. It could be that this hump shape might be why restricting the
functional form to be monotonic gave estimates that were small in size and variable in sign. In
addition, it is worth emphasizing that much of the work above uses data on lower grades. In
contrast, our data is for high school students in Greece. It may well be that class size eects dier
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greatly depending on the context: for young students it may have a large eect while for older
students the eect may be smaller or vice versa. Similarly, eects may be subject specic or dier
in intensity by sub groups. We allow for one such channel of heterogeneous class size eects in
our quantile IV regressions. We are also able to control for teacher xed eects, though only for
a limited subsample. Neither teacher xed eects nor heterogeneous class size eects change our
basic point and results regarding nonmonotonicity.
3 Data and Institutional Background
The Greek education system is run by the Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Aairs.
It exercises control over the state schools in terms of curriculum, stang and funding. Teachers
are civil servants and get a salary based on seniority, location and family size. There are two
tracks for teachers: permanent and temporary or substitute teachers. The former got tenure
after two years of employment before 2013, though this is no longer the case. Teaching needs are
rst met by utilizing existing permanent sta, then by hiring temporary sta and only as a last
resort adding a permanent teacher. As there is an excess supply of teachers for High School, it is
relatively easy to hire on a temporary basis. Temporary teachers get paid on the same scale as
entry level permanent teachers, but only for the work they do. Permanent sta is very dicult
to re, especially in public schools where ring permanent sta is almost unheard of. Not only is
there compensation, but union involvement results in strikes in response to such actions. Teachers
can be red for an inability to do their job but documenting this is very dicult. Even in private
schools, severance pay for permanent teachers includes a month's salary for every year of seniority
up to 25 years. See Stylianidou et al. (2004) for details of how the system works.
In Greece the government provides free education up to 12th grade for all students. There is an
exam for entrance to university but no tuition is charged. This is because the Greek constitution
says that all Greeks (and some foreigners) are entitled to free education. State-run schools and
universities even provide textbooks free to all students, although, from 2011 onward, shortages
have occurred. There are private cram schools that operate side by side with the high schools
where students go for extra tuition to perform better in exams, and this is especially so in the
11th and 12th grades.4 Most of the students attend such classes in the afternoon and evening in
addition to their normal schooling. Private universities and colleges operate alongside the public
ones.
4Cram schools are popular in a number of OECD countries. Out of all OECD countries, Greece is the country
with the second highest number of minutes spent attending after school classes/cram schools, ranking just after
Korea. See OECD (2013).
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In the 10th grade, students have, for the most part, a common curriculum.5 In the 11th and
12th grade, they start to dier as they choose their tracks.6 At the end of 12th grade, most
students take the university entrance exam. Their performance in this exam, together with their
performance in high school determines their placement score for entrance into university.7
Students are assigned to a class (1,2,3,4, etc.). Students in a class stay together for all non track
subjects and teachers move from one class (equivalent to classroom) to another class (classroom).
In the 10th grade, there are no track subjects and so students stay together through the day.
Moreover, they are less likely to attend cram schools or take private tutoring in the 10th grade
as the university entrance exam is still some time away. This is relevant because such tutoring
would be an omitted variable that aects performance that we cannot control for. Also, there
are likely to be more unexpected shocks to enrollment for the 10th grade, than for higher grades
as the incoming class comes from several feeder Junior High Schools.8 This is likely to make the
Hoxby instrument work better in the 10th grade. For all three reasons we focus our attention to
the 10th grade data.
The data used in this paper was obtained from the local school authorities and covers 124
public high schools in Greece. Most students in Greece attend public schools. Our data covers
roughly 10% of the public high schools in Greece. The time period is 2001-2013.
The data we use includes the following: the exam scores of the student in the school exams in
10th grade for non track subjects. The gender, age, number of classrooms for each grade in the
school, class size, cohort size and total enrollment in each school. We also have performance in the
rst term, the second term and the school annual exam. The school annual exam is course and
teacher specic. Performance is measured on a continuous scale from 0-20. We take the simple
average of the annual exam across non track compulsory subjects (Ancient Greek, Literature,
Modern Greek, History, Algebra, Geometry, Physics, Chemistry, Economics, and Technology) to
510th grade compulsory subjects include religion, ancient Greek, literature, modern Greek, history, algebra,
geometry, physics, chemistry, economics, technology and one foreign language.
611th grade compulsory subjects include religion, ancient Greek, literature, modern Greek, history, algebra,
geometry, physics, chemistry, biology, introduction to law, a foreign language and 3 track subjects (which are xed
within each track). Students are required to attend these subjects in eleventh grade and they take either school
or national exams in each one of them. In the 12th grade, they nalize a specialty/track of which there are three:
Classics, Science and Information Technology. 12th grade compulsory subjects are religion, literature, modern
Greek, ancient Greek, history, physics, biology, mathematics, a foreign language (either English, or German, or
French) and 4 track subjects (which are xed within each track). Students are required to attend these subjects in
twelfth grade and they take either school or national exams in each one of them. All other subjects are optional.
7With their placement score in hand they list their preferences. Students are admitted not to schools but to
programs within schools. We do not focus on entrance to university here and do not use the data on preferences,
entrance exam scores, placements scores and nal placements here.
8In the 11th and 12th grade, enrollment tends to lie below the enrollment in the previous year for the grade
below, while in the 10th grade enrollment could lie above or below that for the 10th grade in the previous year.
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get the performance measure we call GPA for each student. We choose to use the annual exam
as it is less likely to be subjective compared to evaluations based on performance over the term.
We know the name of the school, the type of school (public, public elite, evening, private), and
whether the school is urban or rural. We chose to not use evening school data as these schools
are very dierent from regular high schools: they have a very dierent set of guidelines, much
larger class sizes and more mature students. Elite schools are entered by passing an exam and
are for gifted students but they are few in number and as a result we have no elite schools in our
subsample of schools. The inputs available to private schools are likely to be very dierent and
the student mix may also dier. For these reasons we chose to restrict ourselves to public schools.
All schools operate under the same guidelines as the educational system is highly centralized.
In Greece, performance in high school matters because university placement depends on the
performance in the university entrance exam (70%) and on high school exams (30%). However,
performance in 10th grade is not included in this. It matters in terms of which track to choose
in the 11th grade and an average score of 50% in school exams is needed to sit for the university
entrance exam.
3.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1: Sample means and standard deviations
Grade 10 Urban Rural
Individual Level Data
GPA Mean 11.79 11.80 11.61
Std. Dev. (3.79) (3.79) (3.86)
Female Mean 0.54 0.54 0.56
Std. Dev. (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age Mean 15.97 15.97 16.01
Std. Dev. (0.60) (0.58) (1.04)
Obs 81845 78816 3029
Class Level Data
Class Size Mean 22.62 22.83 18.28
Std. Dev. (4.15) (4.02) (4.36)
Obs 3641 3474 167
School Level Data
Cohort Size Mean 76.17 81.65 27.75
Std. Dev. (33.90) (31.06) (13.00)
Class Number Mean 3.37 3.58 1.52
Std. Dev. (1.24) (1.12) (0.59)
Obs 1082 972 110
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Here we share some patterns in the data that motivate much of what we do below. Table
1 shows the mean and standard deviation for the key variables we use. Note that class size is
relatively concentrated around the mean. In fact 90% of the data lies between 16 and 28 class
size. The average school has 3 or 4 classes in a grade, but there is a lot of variability here. Rural
areas usually have small schools with lower enrollments and number of classes that range from 1
to 3, while urban areas have larger schools with as many as 9 classes.
3.2 Data Patterns
3.2.1 Class Size and Enrollment
Figure 1 plots class size versus enrollment for grade 10. The red dashed line gives the predicted
class size had there been a binding cap on class size of 27. The data loosely follows this red line,
but since no cap on class size was in place ocially, this targeted class size may be a result of
administrators choices. For example, if administrators are trying to maximize some increasing
function of learning (as measured by GPA) less costs, given student quality, and nd it roughly
optimal to have a class size close to 27, we might see such a pattern.
3.2.2 Class Size, Enrollment and GPA
Figure 2 plots a smooth version of the relationship between enrollment and class size given by
the black line, and between enrollment and GPA given by the red line. It is worth noting that
especially for low enrollments, class size and GPA seem to be negatively related. As enrollment
rises, class size rst rises till enrollment reaches the mid 20's. After this class size falls and then
rises again near 45 and so on. The turning points of the two seem to be the same. The relationship
becomes much fuzzier for large enrollments.
3.2.3 OLS Estimates
As a purely descriptive exercise, we next turn to the OLS estimates of class size and GPA. As is
well understood, OLS estimates are likely to be biased and should not be interpreted as causal.
Nevertheless, this is the logical starting point for the analysis. Table 2 presents these estimates.
Column 1 does not allow for nonmonotonicity and gives a negative and signicant coecient for
class size. Column 2 adds a quadratic term in class size. The coecients now point to a hump
shape with a turning point around 11. Should we interpret these estimates as representing the
production technology in the classroom between class size and GPA or learning? The answer is
no.
9
0
10
20
30
0 50 100 150
enrol
Actual class size Predicted class size
Figure 1: Class Size versus Enrollment for Grade 10
10
10
10
.5
11
11
.5
12
12
.5
lo
g 
of
 m
ea
n 
G
PA
 (s
m
oo
th
ed
)
0
10
20
30
lo
g 
of
 m
ea
n 
cl
as
s 
si
ze
 (s
m
oo
th
ed
)
0 50 100 150
Enrollment
Class size GPA
Figure 2: Class Size versus Enrollment for Grade 20 (Smooth Version)
11
Table 2: OLS Estimation of Class Size Eects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnClassSize -0.67 3.00 -0.65 3.25
(0.1)*** (1.0)*** (0.1)*** (1.1)***
lnClassSizeSQ -0.62 -0.66
(0.2)*** (0.2)***
female 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.88
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Age -1.55 -1.56 -1.49 -1.50
(0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)***
AgeSQ 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
lnCohortSize 0.20 0.15 0.30 0.25
(0.1)* (0.1) (0.1)*** (0.1)**
sd of ln GPA -5.81 -5.82
(0.3)*** (0.3)***
School FE YES YES YES YES
R-sq 0.057 0.057 0.064 0.064
N 81845 81845 81845 81845
(1) Standard deviations are clustered at class level. *, **, *** indicate
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Why? Suppose class size is being chosen to maximize an increasing function of the learning,
i.e., the GPA of the school, less costs of operation, and say enrollment is exogenously given. For
a given quality of students, or teacher, denoted by q and given enrollment, e, Figure 3 depicts the
benets (B) and costs (C) as class size rises. As class size rises, the benets may rst rise but
ultimately fall and this is depicted as concave function.9 However, as class size rises, costs fall
and this is depicted as a downward sloping convex function. Optimal class size, i.e., the chosen
class size, is where the dierences in the two is largest. This occurs at CS∗(e, q). Thus, in the
data we will see (e, CS∗(e, q), gpa(e, q, CS∗(e, q)). Moreover, we will most likely not observe q.
What happens if q is higher? If for example, students are better, then the benet curve will
shift up and become atter as depicted by the curve B′ since better students would learn more
(have a higher GPA) at any given class size and suer less from larger classes. But faced with a
better class, the chosen class size will rise as depicted to CS∗(e, q′) and in the data we will see
(e, CS∗(e, q′), gpa(e, q, CS∗(e, q′)). Though we want to estimate the curve B, the data will trace
out a atter curve than B. This is the essence of the bias in the OLS estimates and the upward
bias explains why OLS coecients on class size often turn out to be positive.
9Even if GPA rst rises and then falls with class size, one will never choose to be on the upward sloping part.
12
Class Size
B, C
B
B’
C
CS∗(e, q) CS∗(e, q′)
Figure 3: Tradeo between GPA and Class Size
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4 Nonparametric Evidence
Recent work by Chernozhukov et al. (2013) provides a framework applicable to our setting and
with the advantage that minimal assumptions are needed to estimate the eect of class size on
GPA. The approach needs panel data, which we have, and the endogenous regressor (class size)
has to be discrete.
Following their approach we specify the following model:
GPAjt = g(CSjt,αj, εjt)
which has achievement as measured by the average GPA of school j in period t being a function
of the average class size in school j in period t, a school xed eect, αj, and a shock, εjt, that is
school and time specic. This model does not impose any functional restrictions on the relationship
between class size and grade point average. Though class size is discrete, average class size is a
continuous variable. For this reason we discretize the class size into bins below.
We specify this relationship to be at the school level, because nonparametric estimation of this
kind needs a long panel for each j.10
4.1 Assumptions and Approach
The identifying assumption needed for this approach is the following:
Assumption 1 (time-homogeneity)
εjt | CSj, αj ∼ F (. | CSj,αj).
In other words, the distribution of the shock εjt, conditional on the vector of average class sizes
for the school at all periods (denoted by CSj) and the school itself, is time independent as the
function F has no time subscript. Stated slightly dierently, whatever the distribution of the
shock is, its conditional distribution given the vector of average class sizes for school j does not
depend on t. Chernozhukov et al. (2013) interprets this as time being randomly assigned or time
being an instrument along with the distribution of factors other than class size not changing over
time.
10If we had specied the model to hold at the individual level, we would have a panel of length three, though
we would have a lot of students. Similarly, we could have specied the model to be at the class level if we had
information on which teacher was assigned to which class. In this case, we would have a panel of the same length
as that for the model we use, assuming the teacher was there throughout. We do not have data on teachers and
their assignment to classes we cannot use this approach.
14
Note the contrast to the standard assumptions for the linear model
GPAjt = β lnCSjt + αj + εjt
where the identifying assumption is that E(lnCSjt · εjs) = 0 for all t and s. Of course, this
assumption is likely to be violated as class size is highly endogenous. The approach we take does
not need this assumption. The distribution that the shock is drawn from does depend on class size.
However, it is enough for identication that the shock to be drawn from the same distribution at
all times. In eect, variations in class size over time helps identify the eect of interest. Moreover,
the specication we use is not restricted in any parametric way and need not even be monotonic.
Since the class size is bounded by the cohort size, the class size support is nite. Under
Assumption 1, Chernozhukov et al. (2013) show that the average class size eect for schools that
switch from class size level a to class size level b (the movers) is identied. As they explain it, to
see this more easily, assume that we have only two class sizes: CSjt ∈ {0, 1}. Then the model
can be thought as a treatment eect model where CSjt = 1 for the treated and CSjt = 0 for
the untreated. Denote GPAjt(0) = g(0, αj, εjt), and GPAjt(1) = g(1, αj, εjt). Assumption 1
implies that the conditional distribution of (GPAjt(0), GPAjt(1)), given the vector of class sizes
for school i (CSj) does not vary with t. Under this key assumption, the average treatment eect
(ATE) for schools where both groups of class size occur during the observation period is identied.
This is similar to the local average treatment eect (LATE), which is the treatment eect for the
subpopulation that changes its treatment status due to a change in the instrument. As explained
above, time is like an instrument. Thus, the eect of class size on grade point average for schools
that ever changed their class size at some time is identied.
One might be concerned that Assumption 1 does not hold in the data and as a result, the
approach of Chernozhukov et al. (2013) cannot be used. Fortunately, we need not take the as-
sumption on faith. A recent paper, see Ghanem (2017) derives a statistical test to check the
validity of Assumption 1. In the Appendix A we show that using this methodology, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that Assumption 1 holds in the data.11
4.2 Estimates
We choose to discretize class size into three bins. We do so as we will need to estimate the eect
going from each bin to the other so that the number of coecients rises rapidly with the number
of bins. The rst is class size below a cuto s0. The second bin is from s0 to s1, and the third is
11We thank Dalia Ghanem for sharing programming code with us.
15
more than s1. Since these switches are identifying the eects of interest, we need to choose s0 and
s1 to ensure that the bins are such that these switches occur.
Let δlk be the average eect on mean GPA in a school of switching from bin l to k and δ̂lk be
its consistent estimator. In eect, what is done is the following. In each year, each school has a
mean GPA and a mean class size and so falls into one of the three bins. Over the entire sample
period, each school indexed by j can be in either bin 1 only, bin 1 and 2 only, bin 1 and 3 only,
bin 2 and 3 only or in all three bins. We calculate the mean GPA over time for school j when in
bin l = 1, 2, 3. For example, if there were 5 periods and the school was in bins (1, 2, 1, 3, 2) over
these time periods with GPA (g1, g2, g3, g4, g5), then the mean GPA in bin 2 would be (g2 + g5) /2
while the mean GPA in bin 1 would be (g1 + g3) /2. Their dierence would capture ∆
j
12 for school
j. The estimated δ̂12 would then be
δ̂12 =
N∑
j=1
dj∆
j
12
N∑
j=1
dj
where dj is 1 if the school was ever in both bin 1 and 2 over the entire sample period.
We set s0 at 15 and s1 at 22. δ̂12 = 1.55 and δ̂23 = −.18. Both are signicantly dierent from
zero at the 1% level. In Table A.1 in the Appendix B, we vary s1 from 21 to 24 along the rows
and s0 from 12 to 17 along the columns. For each value of s0 and s1 we give the estimate of δ̂12
and δ̂23. Note that no matter what s0 to s1 are set at, δ̂12 > 0, δ̂23 < 0 and signicant. This is
consistent with a nonmonotonic relationship between GPA and class size.
5 Linear and Nonlinear Parametric Estimates
In view of the nonparametric results above which suggest an inverse U shape for the eect of class
size on GPA, we include a quadratic term in the parametric specication. Our specication is:
GPAijt = β lnCSjt + γ (lnCSjt)
2 + αj + λXijt + εijt.
GPA for individual i in school j at time t depends on the log of class size, its square, school xed
eects, and a set of control, Xijt, which include gender, age, age squared, the standard deviation
of the GPA in the class. Why might class size and GPA be hump shaped? One reason given
in the literature, see Borland et al. (2005) and Dobbelsteen et al. (2002), is that students learn
from peers like themselves. The larger the class size, the more likely it is that they have peers
like themselves. This force makes GPA rise with class size. On the other hand, a larger class
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size reduces the attention a teacher can give to each student. For low class sizes, the rst set of
forces dominate but after a point the second does, creating a hump shaped pattern. It has also
been argued that a homogeneous class is easier to teach, see Levin (2001) and Dobbelsteen et al.
(2002). For this reason we include the standard deviation of GPA in the class as a control.
Since class size could be an endogenous variable, we need an instrument. We cannot use the
Angrist and Lavy (1999) approach. There is no maximum class size on the books in Greece in our
period. The data patterns described in Section 3.2 clearly suggest that class size is endogenous.
From looking at the pattern of enrollment and class size in Figure 1, it seems clear that class size
is not allowed to get too large: the actual and predicted class size had there been a cap of 27 are
not quite in line though they are closer together for low enrollment than for high.12 We follow
the approach of Hoxby (2000). It is natural to think of overall enrollment as an exogenous shock
to class size. Hoxby's approach goes a step further: she ts a quartic to the enrollment data and
uses deviations from the quartic as the exogenous variation. In this way, she controls for trends
in enrollment.
Table 3 and Table 4 give the IV estimates for grade 10 for the linear and quadratic models
respectively. We present estimates when the standard deviation of GPA in the class is controlled
for and when it is not. The standard errors are clustered at the class level. The lower panel of the
table gives estimates for the rst stage while the upper panel gives the estimates for the second
stage in all these tables.
Recall that the OLS estimate of the coecient on lnClassSize in the linear regression was
negative and about -.067. The coecient with the IV for the same regression is given in column 1
and is -3.25. Note that this is exactly what one would have expected due to endogeneity bias. If
the administrator is choosing class size, classes with better students will tend to be larger as such
larger class size has little cost in terms of GPA and OLS is upward biased as in these estimates.
If we add the standard deviation of GPA as a control, as in column 2, the coecient on lnclass
size is slightly smaller. The coecient on standard deviation is negative, consistent with more
diverse students being harder to teach. Table 4 gives the estimates for the quadratic specication.
It clearly has the hump shape expected with a peak at around 14.9.
We use Hoxby's instrument so that we would expect the shock in enrollment to be positively
correlated with class size as we nd. Note that the rst stage looks ne: the coecient on the
instrument is positive signicant at 1% and the instruments are not weak as the Kleibergen-Paap
LM statistic is 114.7. It is interesting, and in line with the literature that women have a higher
GPA. The standard deviation of GPA in a class is added as an explanatory variable in the second
12In fact, when we tried using the Angrist Lavy approach, though the rst stage did not cause any problems, the
second stage gave insignicant/mixed sign coecient estimates.
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column of Table 3 and Table 4. It is signicant at the 1% level and negative. This suggests that
the more homogeneous the class, the higher the GPA as in Levin (2001) and Dobbelsteen et al.
(2002).
While we nd strong evidence for a nonmonotonic relationship between class size and achieve-
ment, our results are entirely consistent with ndings in the literature, see for example Jepsen and
Rivkin (2009), that reducing class size is an expensive way of improving achievement. Figure 4
depicts the quadratic relation we estimate. Note that the value of the intercept is not meaningful
as we have school xed eects and other controls. We choose to center the gure at class size 5
and GPA zero. The curve is relatively at in the region near the peak by denition. As a result,
changing the class size in this region would give small eects. If the curve is not too peaked, this
region could be quite large. This might be why even the experimental literature, see Jepsen and
Rivkin (2009) for example, found small eects on performance of fairly large changes in class size.
Table 3: Parametric Estimation of Linear Class Size with IVs
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: GPA
Second Stage
lnClassSize -3.25 -2.85
(0.5)*** (0.4)***
female 0.89 0.88
(0.03)*** (0.03)***
Age -1.59 -1.53
(0.10)*** (0.10)***
AgeSQ 0.024 0.023
(0.002)*** (0.002)***
sd of ln GPA -5.56
(0.3)***
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 1029.0 1030.6
p-value 0.000 0.000
School FE YES YES
R-sq 0.047 0.056
N 81845 81845
First Stage
lnClassSize lnClassSize
lnU 0.25 0.24
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
(1) Standard deviations are clustered at class level. *, **,
*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 4: Parametric Estimation of Nonlinear Class Size with IVs
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: GPA
Second Stage
lnClassSize 29.1 29.0
(5.9)*** (5.9)***
lnClassSizeSQ -5.44 -5.36
(1.0)*** (1.0)***
Female 0.89 0.88
(0.03)*** (0.03)***
Age -1.70 -1.64
(0.10)*** (0.09)***
AgeSQ 0.027 0.026
(0.002)*** (0.002)***
sd of ln GPA -5.76
(0.4)***
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 114.7 114.7
p-value 0.000 0.000
School FE YES YES
R-sq 0.032 0.042
N 81845 81845
First Stage
lnClassSize lnClassSizeSQ lnClassSize lnClassSizeSQ
lnU 0.45 2.22 0.45 2.22
(0.06)*** (0.3)*** (0.06)*** (0.3)***
lnUSQ -0.065 -0.24 -0.064 -0.24
(0.02)*** (0.10)** (0.02)*** (0.10)**
(1) Standard deviations are clustered at class level. *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
A possible concern might be that we have so far not controlled for which teachers taught which
class. We were able to obtain and digitalize teachers' assignment data for 10 schools. For this
subsample, we are able to control for teacher xed eects as a robustness check, to control for the
teachers' quality. The dependent variable is GPA for each subject and for each student, not the
average GPA since we are controlling for teacher xed eects. In addition to teachers' xed eects,
we include subject and school xed eects in Table 5. Though the point estimates do change a
bit, the quadratic form remains. For the rest of the paper, we return to using the full sample.
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Table 5: Nonlinear Class Size with Teachers' Fixed Eects
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Subject GPA
Second Stage
lnClassSize 50.2 40.3
(21.9)** (21.6)*
lnClassSizeSQ -8.19 -6.46
(3.6)** (3.6)*
Female 0.96 0.95
(0.08)*** (0.08)***
Age 5.64 5.69
(1.1)*** (1.1)***
AgeSQ -0.20 -0.21
(0.03)*** (0.03)***
sd of ln GPA -5.62
(0.3)***
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic
p-value 1648.8 1649.5
School FE YES YES
Subject FE YES YES
Teacher FE YES YES
R-sq 0.224 0.240
N 17212 17212
First Stage
lnClassSize lnClassSizeSQ lnClassSize lnClassSizeSQ
lnU -0.0079 -0.27 -0.0061 -0.26
(0.02) (0.09)*** (0.02) (0.09)***
lnUSQ 0.17 1.12 0.17 1.12
(0.006)*** (0.03)*** (0.006)*** (0.03)***
(1) *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Figure 4: Estimated GPA production function
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6 Quantile Eects
So far we have allowed for nonmonotonicities in how class size aects GPA. In this section, we
extend our approach to allow for quantile eects. We do so as it is possible that students of
dierent abilities respond dierently to larger class size. One hypothesis is that better students
are less aected by class size as they are able to do it alone. If this were the case, we might
expect a hump shape for all quantiles, but with the hump being attened out at higher quantiles.
It is worth recalling that a quantile regression does not simply take the data and split it into
quantiles, conditional on the independent variable, as doing so would result in selection bias.
Rather, it does something more subtle. Suppose we had a linear regression model,
y = Xβ + u
where we observe data (Xi, yi) for i = 1...n individuals, and we wanted to allow for quantile eects.
Since
(
y −Xβ̂
)
would be the best proxy for u, the coecient β̂α for the linear regression for the
αth quantile is obtained as
β̂α = arg min
∑
i
α |yi −Xiβ| I(yi −Xiβ > 0) + (1− α) |yi −Xiβ| I(yi −Xiβ < 0).
Suppose α = .1. Then, for individual i there is a 10% probability that yi−Xiβ > 0 and a 90%
probability that it is negative. The above formula chooses β̂.1 so that if 10% of the deviations are
positive and 90% are negative, the expected deviations are minimized. Note the contrast to the
simple minded approach described above. In fact, even if the model were truly linear, choosing
10% of the data at any X to lie below the estimated regression would not even give a linear
regression coecient.
We use the approach of Lee (2007) to estimate the quantile IV regressions. Note that we do
not include school xed eects in the quantile IV regression since we were unable to include such a
large number of xed eects. We use the same instrument as in the previous section. We present
the quadratic version of the regression.
Table 6 gives the estimates for the quadratic form and Figure 5 depicts these estimates graph-
ically. Note that in order to be able to compare the three curves visually we anchor them to zero
at class size 10. It is worth noting that the hump shape remains. However, it is clear from this
depiction that the 10% quantile (the worst students) is more hump shaped than the 50% quantile
which in turn is slightly more hump shaped than the 90% quantile. This is exactly what one would
expect if better students are less aected by class size.
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While we have specied a quadratic form for our model which allows for nonmonotonic rela-
tionship between GPA and class size in our quantile regressions, it would be ideal to do this fully
nonparametrically. Unfortunately, we are unaware of any technique to do so at this time and this
is left for future work. Note that we did estimate the regression, though not allowing for quantile
eects, nonparametrically in Section 4.
Table 6: Quantile Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Quantile 10% Quantile 50% Quantile 90%
lnClassSize 4.73 3.15 4.14
[3.80,6.41] [1.79,5.72] [1.04,5.85]
lnClassSizeSQ -0.79 -0.45 -0.71
[-1.07,-0.62] [-0.89,-0.19] [-0.99,-0.20]
(1) The brackets are the 95% condence intervals.
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Figure 5: Quantile Eects of Class Size (Three quantiles)
With the estimates of the eects of class size on achievement in hand, we are in a position to
understand how class size might be chosen. If the government cares about achievement, and faces
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costs of adding and removing classes, its behavior in terms of the number of classes it chooses as
enrollment uctuates helps us estimate the costs involved. We use our reduced form estimates
with a dynamic structural model of class size to estimate hiring/ring and marginal cost of adding
a class. In Greece, as in much of the rest of the world, teachers unions are a powerful force to be
reckoned with. Their power is expressed not only in terms of wages set but in terms of the ability
to re teachers at will. We use the model to ask whether inexibility in terms of unions creating
high ring (and even maybe hiring) costs might be driving class size choices by government and
the impact of this on student achievement if any. We nd that unions, even if they raise costs and
class size have a small eect on achievement.
7 The Structural Model
In the previous sections, we have shown that GPA has an inverse U shape with respect to class
size. In this section, we ask what an administrator who is trying to do his best for his students but
subject to constraints would choose to do. We posit that the administrator is trying to maximize
a welfare function that depends on the mean GPA of the students enrolled, as well as the number
of students enrolled. Enrollment, et, is taken as an exogenous AR1 process and estimated from
the data.
et = γ0 + γ1et−1 + µt (1)
where, et is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution with mean γ0 + γ1et−1 with the error term
µt. We estimate the enrollment process separately for schools of dierent sizes. We put roughly
25% in the small and large enrollment groups and 50% in the middle enrollment group.
The constraints the administrator faces are of two kinds. First, he faces the trade o we have
estimated between class size and GPA and the enrollment process which is exogenously given to
him. We can think of these as technical constraints.13 Second, he faces costs associated with the
choices he makes. In our model, the only choice the administrator makes is the number of classes,
nt, to have at a point of time. Each additional class has a given cost which can be thought of
as the cost of the teachers needed for the additional class. Since teachers unions are prevalent in
Greece, ring teachers is costly. Moreover, nding a new teacher also involves a number of costs
including advertising the position, interviewing, and so on. The empirical transition probabilities
are in Table 7. Note that schools tend to keep the same number of classes across years. This is
13The trade-o between GPA and class size the administrator faces is analogous to the production function a
manager choosing inputs would face. The enrollment process (et) can be thought of as similar to an exogenous
TFP process.
24
especially so for schools with a small number of classes.
For these reasons we allow for hiring and ring costs in the model. This makes the problem
dynamic. At any point of time, the administrator must consider the number of teachers he has,
the enrollment today and the enrollment process he faces, as well as the range of costs and look
forward to nd his best decision today.
Table 7: Transition of Class Number
nt−1
nt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 0.7143 0.2727 0.0130 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2 0.0813 0.6986 0.2010 0.0144 0.0048 0.0000 0.0000
3 0.0034 0.1399 0.6007 0.2389 0.0171 0.0000 0.0000
4 0.0000 0.0036 0.2456 0.5979 0.1459 0.0071 0.0000
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0405 0.2162 0.6622 0.0743 0.0068
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0645 0.3871 0.4194 0.1290
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7500 0.2500
The administrator cares about the mean GPA. As this has a quadratic form, and as e
n
is the
average class size, we have
GPAt = a ln
et
nt
+ b
(
ln
et
nt
)2
+ A.
A is the value of the other variables in the regression at their mean levels. It is worth noting that
its value will not aect the choice of the number of classes below. We assume that having twice
the students with the same GPA gives the administrator twice the utility. This makes sense as
the object is to educate students and educating twice as many to the same level gives twice the
utility. Thus, so far we have the administrator's utility as
et
[
a ln
et
nt
+ b
(
ln
et
nt
)2
+ A
]
.
The administrator faces hiring and ring cost of H and F , and a variable cost per class of
c which we interpret as the salary of the additional teacher(s) needed for one more class. The
administrator knows the realization of et and knows the state variable, nt−1, and the random
utility shock εnt, when he makes his choices. This shock is not observed by the econometrician.
εt = {ε1t, ε2t, ε3t...ε10t} is a vector of shocks and each element is drawn from a type 1 generalized
extreme value distribution. Since no school has more than 10 classes, we restrict the size of the
vector to be 10. This assumption allows us to use the logit setup and t the data parsimoniously.
In some periods we may see a larger class size, i.e., fewer classes, than in others. The reason for
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this comes partly from enrollment declines, partly because fewer classes were present in the past
and there are hiring costs, and partly from the shock.
Thus, the administrators value function is:
V (et, nt−1, εt;θ) = Max
nt
{
et
[
a ln
et
nt
+ b
(
ln
et
nt
)2
+ A
]
− cnt
−H ·max(nt − nt−1, 0)− F ·max(nt−1 − nt, 0) + εntt
+ δEεt+1,et+1V (et+1,nt, εt+1;θ)
}
where et+1 = γ0 + γ1et + µt+1 and where θ = (c,H, F, σ).
Note that the expectation is taken over both εt+1 and et+1, the shock to utility and the shock to
enrollment respectively. Note that though Aet enters the objective function, it will not aect the
optimal choice of nt as it is exogenous. From here on we may not explicitly condition on θ as
above, but it should be taken for granted.
Rewriting this slightly for notational ease we dene u(et, nt, nt−1) as the deterministic com-
ponent of current period contribution to the objective function and V (et, nt−1) as the ex ante
value function, i.e., the value of behaving optimally from tomorrow onwards before knowing the
realization of the utility shock.
u(et, nt, nt−1) = et
[
a ln
et
nt
+ b
(
ln
et
nt
)2
+ A
]
− cnt
−H max(nt − nt−1, 0)− F max(nt−1 − nt, 0)
V (et+1, nt) = Eεt+1 [V (et+1, nt, εt+1)]
v(et, nt, nt−1) = u(et, nt, nt−1) + δEµt+1 [V (et+1, nt)|et] (2)
so that
V (et, nt−1, εt) = max
nt
v(et, nt, nt−1) + εntt.
Thus we have rewritten the value function as a base utility and a shock. Since εntt follows an
iid type 1 generalized extreme value distribution with variance σ2, the probability of nt is
p(nt|nt−1, et;θ) =
exp(v(et, nt, nt−1;θ))∑10
n=1 exp(v(et, n, nt−1;θ))
.
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7.1 Identication and Estimation
We rst provide some intuition behind what pins down θ before we turn to the estimation part.
The problem is modeled as a dynamic discrete choice problem. We bring the estimates of the
quadratic model for achievement from the reduced form regressions to the structural model. As
estimated in the parametric quadratic model, b = −5.36 and a = 29.0. It remains to estimate
θ = (c,H, F, σ). How can we identify θ? One way to get some intuition about which features of
the data would help identify which parameters is to ask how a simulation based approach might
pin down the parameters. We do not use this approach, but nevertheless, this is a useful exercise.
To see how the optimization works, it is useful to think of the problem in a slightly dierent
way where we rst dene the pre-value function as W (et, nt, εntt). W (.) is the value of the ow
utility today (excluding the adjustment costs) and behaving optimally from tomorrow onwards
for every value of nt chosen today. Note that we have a choice in terms of the parameters to
estimate: the weight on GPA or the variance of the utility shock since both cannot be separately
identied. We choose to set the weight on GPA at unity as the variance of the utility shock is
easier to interpret.
W (et, nt, εt) = et
[
a ln
et
nt
+ b
(
ln
et
nt
)2]
− cnt + εntt
+δEεt+1,µt+1V (et+1,nt, εt+1) (3)
Then,
V (et, nt−1, εt) = max
nt
{W (et, nt, εt)−H ·max(nt − nt−1, 0)− F ·max(nt−1 − nt, 0)}
To begin with, let us see how the model works when we take n to be continuous, the pre-value
function to be concave, and set the utility shocks to zero. In this case, the current period problem
can be depicted as in Figure 6 where W (et, nt, εt = 0) is depicted by the concave curve. Consider
such a school with a given enrollment as well as utility shocks set at zero. Anchor the linear
adjustment costs to nt−1 as depicted. The cost of increasing the number of classes has slope H
and decreasing it has slope F while making no change in their number has no cost. The optimal
choice of nt is that which maximizes the dierence in the pre-value function and these adjustment
costs. Let nL be where the slope of the pre-value function is H and nH be where the slope is
−F . It is obvious from the picture that if nt−1 exceeds nH , it is optimal to reduce nt to nH , i.e.,
increase class size, and if nt−1 falls short of n
L,to raise nt−1 to n
L, that is reduce class size. If
nt−1 lies in the interval
[
nL, nH
]
it is optimal to keep nt = nt−1. This region of inaction is created
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by these adjustment costs which are not dierentiated at 0. The higher the adjustment costs, the
larger this region of inactionue.14 The size of H and F will be pinned down by the bounds of the
region of inaction,
[
nL, nH
]
which would be observed in the data.15
Class Number
W (·) Adjustment Cost
W (·)
nt−1 nL nt−1nH
Figure 6: Identication of Adjustment Cost H,F
When we add back the utility shocks and the discreteness of n, the stark predictions of the
restricted model above are tempered. The depiction in Figure 6 changes so that the pre-value
14It is worth noting that a change in H or F will also shift the pre-value function as it will change the continuation
value. However, this eect will be second order relative to the direct eect of H and F .
15It can be shown that the eect of an increase in hiring costs will be greater for nL, the hiring cuto, than for
nH , the ring one. Similarly, an increase in F will have a greater eect for nH than for nL.Thus, if we think of
the combinations of H and F that are consistent with a given value for the hiring cuto as well as those consistent
with the ring cuto we will get a unique value of H and F which are consistent with both. As a result, there is a
unique H and F that correspond to give values of
[
nL, nH
]
which would be observed from the data.
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function is discretized. At each of the ten values taken by n, there is a base value plus the shock.
As a result, the curve connecting the grid points of the analogue of the pre-value function need
not be concave. However, the optima choice will still be such that given nt−1, the dierence in
the pre-value and adjustment costs is maximized. And an increase in the adjustment costs would
increase the region of inaction and aect the probability of transitioning into this region. In this
way, the empirical transition probabilities help pin down H and F in the data.
These same empirical transition probabilities also help pin down the variance of the shock.
Given the enrollment process, when the variance rises, the transition probabilities also rise.
How is the nal parameter, c, pinned down? As c rises, having more classes becomes more
expensive and the number of classes falls. Thus c is pinned down by the average number of classes
given enrollment, or equivalently, the average class size.
Having sketched out the intuition behind identication, we move on to the details of estimation.
The estimation can be thought of as proceeding in two steps. First estimate the process for
enrollment. Then estimate θ.
7.2 Estimating Enrollment
We rst test for whether the AR1 process we specify ts the data. We break the data into three
parts. For schools with enrollment less than or equal to 53, for schools with enrollment above 53
but below 99 and for schools with enrollment greater than or equal to 99. Think of these as small
schools with one class per grade, medium schools with one or sometimes two classes a grade, and
large schools with two or more classes per grade. We then run the AR1 process separately for each
of these three groups. Finally we test whether the estimates for the three groups dier from each
other. We expect that γ1 might be the same, but that γ0 is likely to be lower for smaller schools.
Our reason for expecting this is that these schools tend to stay in the same rough size groups,
though their enrollment uctuates year by year. The enrollment process is given by equation (1).
If there was no random component, µt, then this enrollment process results in the data generated
by it being on the straight line with slope less than 1 depicted in Figure 7. This would result in a
steady state at point A in Figure 7. This means that all schools would have the same enrollment
in steady state. Adding a random component will make the process generate data that falls in a
band around the straight line in Figure 7. The width of this band depends on the variance of µt.
This will give a distribution of steady states in Figure 7. Note that in this case, schools will not
tend to stay in their own rough groups over time.
What would be consistent with schools staying in their own group? If γ0 was dierent (and
higher for larger schools) even if γ1 and the distribution of µt was the same across groups, then
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the process without a random component would be depicted by the lines in Figure 7. Note that
as depicted, each group has a dierent steady state size interval. Adding back randomness would
create bands around the lines as before and create a distribution of steady states for each group
size, as shown in Figure 8. If these intervals overlapped, there could be some movement between
groups in steady state. The estimates for the estimated enrollment process from the actual data
for each group are presented in Table 8. Figure 9 depicts both the actual data and the estimated
lines. Note that the actual data and lines look a lot like the simulated data. In particular, the
slopes are not signicantly dierent from one another while the intercepts dier signicantly from
each other.
Table 8: Estimation of Enrollment Process
<= 53 53 < enrol < 99 >= 99
γ1 0.71 0.60 0.63
sd (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
γ0 10.27 30.45 43.08
sd (0.49) (0.94) (2.42)
N 264 535 244
(1) The standard errors are presented in
parentheses.
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31
7.3 Estimation of θ
Recall that since εt is assumed to have an iid type I generalized extreme value distribution, we
know that equation (4) holds.
p(nt|nt−1, et,θ) =
exp(v(et, nt, nt−1))∑10
n=1 exp(v(et, n, nt−1))
. (4)
V (et, nt−1) = Eεtmax
nt
[v(et, nt,nt−1) + εntt]
=
10∑
nt=1
p(nt|nt−1, et,θ)Eεt (v(et, nt,nt−1) + εntt|nt is optimal)
since Eεtmax
n
f(n, εt) =
∑
n
p(n)Eεt [f(n, εt|n being the maximum] where p(n) is the probability
that n is the maximum at a particular value. In other words, the ex-ante value function is just
the probability that each is the optimal choice (given enrollment today and the number of classes
inherited) times the payo from then on.
Using the form of the distribution of εt and some calculations yields
V (et, nt−1) = ln
(
10∑
n=1
exp
[
u(et, n, nt−1) + δEet+1 [V (et+1, n)|et]
])
+ γ
where γ is Euler's constant.
By value function iteration, we can solve V (e, n), and thus v(et, nt−1, nt). This is essentially
nding a xed point of a function. By taking a grid and guessing values of the function V (et+1, n)
over the grid, this reduces the problem to a nite dimensional one. e is allowed to take values from
1 to 1000 since the largest school in the data has far less than 1000 students. This guess, together
with the estimated process for enrollment gives a numerical value of Eµt+1 [V (et+1, n)|et] over the
grid. For given parameter values, we can calculate u(et, n, nt−1) so that we get a numerical value
for the RHS over the grid which is the new guess. We stop when the guess and the new guess are
close enough, i.e., when we have a xed point. Since δ < 1 and the enrollment process is stable,
i.e., γ1 < 1, this is a contraction mapping and this process converges to the xed point. Having
solved for V (et+1, n) we use equation (2) to solve for v(et, nt, nt−1), which in turn gives the value
for p(nt|nt−1, et;θ). Finally, we choose θ to maximize the likelihood of the empirical transition
probabilities
L = Πi p(nit|nit−1, eit;θ)
32
to get the estimated θ.
Table 9: Estimation of the Structural Dynamic Model
Average Cohort Size c H F σ
All 171.30 99.06 156.49 140.24
sd (51.59) (42.90) (42.41) (19.82)
Euro e20,572 e11,896 e18,793
The estimates are presented in Table 9. A larger variance indicates that idiosyncratic shocks
matter more when schools choose the number of classes. Idiosyncratic shocks could be the avail-
ability of spaces and teachers. The variable cost of adding a class is given by c. The xed cost of
adding a class is H while the xed cost of subtracting a class is F .
Suppose that the cost of an additional class is one teacher's salary in Greece. The salary after
15 years' experience with minimum training for a high school teacher is about e20,572 in 2004
(Stylianidou et al., 2004). H and F are the adjustment costs per class. To get the adjustment
cost in Euros, we divide H by c and then multiply by the Euro cost of an additional class. These
Euro cost estimates are given in the lower part of the entry in Table 9. It costs e11,896 to add
a new class and e18,793 to drop a class. The cost of dropping a class is much higher than the
cost of adding a class. This is reasonable in Greece as ring a teacher is hard for public schools.
The optimal class size in the absence of adjustment costs is 27.
7.4 Counterfactual Exercises
In Greece, as in many countries, teachers are unionized and as a result, ring a teacher is quite
costly. The rst counterfactual exercise we consider is the eect of reducing ring cost to zero.
How would this aect the class size and GPA. On the one hand, ring teachers will be easy
which will raise class size relative to the status quo. This is the direct eect. On the other hand,
since its easy to re teachers, it is more likely they will be hired, which reduces class size. This
is the indirect eect. Ex ante, the net eect is not obvious. The results of this counterfactual
are presented in Table 10. We use the estimated processes for enrollment for each size school to
simulate the model. We simulate 1000 schools for each school size. For each simulated school, we
simulate 100 periods. We calculate the mean eects using the last 10 periods as the data is by
then invariant to choice of starting point. The simulations show that class size and GPA change
for the dierent school groups as in Table 10. Reducing ring cost to zero raises average class
size by about 4 students and reduces GPA by about a point (recall the scale was from 1-20) and
by more for smaller schools than for larger schools. Since class size is larger, fewer teachers are
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hired, and thus, variable cost is lower. The total costs, variable and adjustment, fall relative to
the status quo by 14 to 19%. Finally we calculate the welfare change. The total welfare increases
by 1 to 3%.
Online platforms and internet have made hiring easier in a number of ways. Schools can post
openings online and teachers can apply to multiple posts more easily than before. If we think of
this as reducing hiring costs, we could ask what the eect might be of further improvements in the
matching technology. These costs will never vanish, but could be reduced signicantly. In the next
counterfactual, we reduce hiring costs by half and evaluate the eects on class size and GPA. In
both these exercises we are looking only at the partial equilibrium eects of these changes. These
results are presented in Table 10. Reducing hiring cost decreases class size by 1 to 2 students as
more teachers are hired and raises GPA slightly, and more so for smaller schools. The total cost
goes up as schools hires more teachers (so that variable costs rise). As shown in the last column,
total welfare, which includes the ow utility, adjustment costs and the continuation value, rises,
though by under 1%.
The next counterfactual looks at the case where the variable cost increases by 50%, i.e., the
teachers' salary is raised by 50%. Class size rises by by 4-7 students and GPA falls by more than
a full point in all cases. The impact in terms of class size and GPA is larger for small schools
than larger schools. The total cost goes up by 12 to 24% and welfare decreases. Note that costs
overall rise by less than 50% as there are adjustments on the hiring and ring margins. It is
well understood that quality teacher has a large impact on students performance. Higher salary
attracts better teachers. Our calculations do not include any improvement in teacher quality due
to higher wages paid and so are likely to over estimate the welfare losses of this policy.
The next counterfactual is to look at the eects of a class size cap at 25, 30 and 35 on class
size. Class caps cause schools to add class well before the cap is reached when the enrollment is
more volatile and the adjustment cost is large. The eects of such caps are larger for small schools
since they have smaller margins to adjust. As a result, such caps will impact small schools more.
Consider a class size cap of 25. For small schools, this reduces class size dramatically by more
than 12 students, while large schools have class size falling by 7-8 students. Welfare falls by 16%
for small schools and 6% for large ones while costs rise by 65% for small schools and 38% for large
ones. Even when a class cap of 35, which is well above 27 which looks like the targeted class size
found in the data, has a considerable impact, especially for small schools. Class size falls by 8
for small schools and 2-3 for large ones. The literature has found almost uniformly that changing
class size tends to be a costly way of raising academic achievement. We also nd this. In addition,
we nd that even caps which seem non binding have very signicant impacts, especially for small
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schools.
Table 10: Counterfactuals
∆ Average Class Size ∆ Average GPA ∆ Cost ∆ Welfare
(#) (points) (%) (%)
F ′ = 0
Small 4.12 -0.90 0.81 1.03
Medium 4.08 -0.95 0.86 1.02
Large 3.59 -0.84 0.86 1.01
H ′ = 0.5H
Small -1.75 0.35 1.06 1.01
Medium -1.15 0.24 1.05 1.00
Large -1.22 0.26 1.05 1.00
c′ = 1.5c
Small 6.13 -1.35 1.12 0.90
Medium 5.16 -1.21 1.24 0.90
Large 4.71 -1.10 1.24 0.91
Class Cap = 25
Small -12.19 1.57 1.65 0.84
Medium -8.47 1.37 1.46 0.91
Large -7.52 1.35 1.38 0.94
Class Cap = 30
Small -9.36 1.58 1.37 0.91
Medium -5.91 1.10 1.24 0.96
Large -4.72 0.95 1.20 0.97
Class Cap = 35
Small -8.10 1.46 1.23 0.95
Medium -3.49 0.70 1.15 0.98
Large -2.50 0.54 1.08 0.99
8 Conclusions
Our work shows a clear hump shaped relationship between class size and GPA. Moreover, the
hump shape remains even when we allow for quantile eects. In addition, there is some evidence
that class size matters more for weaker students. We speculate that the mixed results prevalent
in the literature on the relationship between class size and achievement is due to the focus on a
linear specication.
Our estimates also help explain why changes in class size in practice did not have a large eect
on student achievement. See Jepsen and Rivkin (2009) who nds small eects of a reduction of
class size from 30 to 20 for students in kindergarden to third grade. This could come from the
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relationship between class size and GPA being hump shaped and from moving from one size of
the hump to the other or from the slope being small in absolute terms. Of course, the shape of
this relationship could vary by subject and grade. If the relationship had more curvature, then
class size might be a far less costly way of improving achievement than previously thought, but
there is little work on this in the literature.
Our structural estimates are reasonable and suggest that reducing ring costs actually hurts
achievement. Teachers' unions may not be as pernicious as might be thought. Reducing hiring
cost, which might be done at low cost given the web has reduced search costs, decreases class
size and thus, improves students' achievement. Class size caps have large eects even when they
are set above average levels, and their eects are more pronounced for small schools. A class size
cap forces schools to add a class before they would want to do so in order to not cross the cap if
enrollment surges.
A channel we could not fully explore and is potentially more important, is the eect of teacher
quality on achievement and how this varies by the ability of the students. Does having a good
teacher in a core subject like Mathematics have spillover eects on performance in other subjects
like Physics? We know from past work, see Chetty et al. (2014), that the eect of teacher quality
on achievement is large. Further work that controls for both student ability and teacher ability
and spillovers across subjects taken to better understand the impact of better teachers on students
of dierent abilities would be valuable.
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A Testing the time-homogeneity assumption
Assumption 1 (time-homogeneity).
εjt | CSj, αj ∼ F (. | CSj,αj).
Ghanem (2017) derived testable equality restrictions for the time-homogeneity Assumption
1. She therefore proposed a statistical test based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Cramer-von-Mises
statistics. Below, we explain the intuition of the test. For the sake of simplicity, suppose we
only have two periods. As mentioned in Chernozhukov et al. (2013), the time-homogeneity as-
sumption is equivalent to (εjt, αj)|CSj. =d (εj1, αj)|CSj., for all t. Then this assumption implies
that the conditional distribution of the second period average GPA for a school j is the same as
its conditional distribution of the rst period average GPA given its history of class size choices
CSj. = (x, x
′). Indeed, we have:
(εj2, αj)|CSj. = (x, x′) =d (εj1, αj)|CSj. = (x, x′)
⇒ g(x′, αj, εj2)|CSj. = (x, x′) =d g(x, αj, εj1)|CSj. = (x, x′)
⇒ g(CSj2, αj, εj2)|CSj. = (x, x′) =d g(CSj1, αj, εj1)|CSj. = (x, x′)
⇒ GPAj2|CSj. = (x, x′) =d GPAj1|CSj. = (x, x′),
where =d means equal in distribution.
Testing procedure: bootstrap
Let TN be a test statistic. The following summarizes the steps of the test.
1. Compute the statistic TN for the original data {(GPA1., CS1.), . . . , (GPAN., CSN.)}.
2. Resample N observations {(GPA∗1., CS∗1.), . . . , (GPA∗N., CS∗N.)} with replacement from the
original data. Compute T bN , the centered statistic for the bth bootstrap sample.
3. Repeat points 1. and 2. B times.
4. Calculate the p-values of the tests with p = 1
B
∑B
b=1 1{T bN > TN}. Reject if p-value is smaller
than some signicance level α.
For the implementation of the test, we set B = 500. We use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and
Cramer-von-Mises statistics (See (Ghanem, 2017) for details on the formulas). All p-values are
40
higher than 10%, suggesting that the identifying Assumption 1 is not rejected at any 1%, 5% nor
10% signicance levels. The p-values for the standard parallel trend assumption are 0.99 and 0.90
for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Cramer-von-Mises statistics, respectively.
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